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THE RISE AND FALL OF SWEDISH UNEMPLOYMENT
Abstract
By international standards, unemployment in Sweden remained remarkably low throughout
the 1970s and the 1980s. In the early 1990s, however, the unemployment rate skyrocketed
and hit double-digit levels. Unemployment remained high for several years but exhibited a
marked fall from 1997 and onwards. The paper describes this development and discusses the
causes of the rise and fall of unemployment. It is argued that the steep rise in unemployment
was mainly the result of a series of adverse macroeconomic shocks, partly self-inflicted by
bad policies and partly caused by unfavourable international developments. Institutional
factors, such as a trend increase in the generosity of unemployment insurance, caused some
secular rise in NAIRU but do not appear as promising explanations of the events of the early
1990s. The fall in unemployment in the late 1990s reflects a combination of favorable
macroeconomic conditions and structural factors that may have reduced the NAIRU.
JEL Code: E24, J60, J64.
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1. Introduction 
During the 1980s, Swedish labor market performance was widely appreciated as a remarkable 
success story. Whereas unemployment in Western Europe climbed to double-digit figures, the 
Swedish unemployment rate remained exceptionally low by international standards. The 
average unemployment rate during the 1980s was around 2 percent and by the end of the 
decade it had fallen to 1.5 percent. Employment-to-population rates were also exceptionally 
high by international standards. In 1990, total employment had risen to 83 percent of the 
working age population, whereas the average European figure was 61 percent and the OECD 
average 65 percent. These favorable outcomes were often seen as the result of a combination 
of coordinated wage bargaining that delivered wage moderation and active labor market 
policies that facilitated matching between vacancies and unemployed job searchers (see for 
example Layard et al, 1991). 
 
The rosy picture of outstanding Swedish labor market performance has not fared well during 
the 1990s. Between 1990 and 1993, unemployment increased from 1.6 percent to 8.2 percent 
and total employment declined to 73 percent of working age population. For five successive 
years in the mid-1990s, official unemployment was stuck at around 8 percent whereas 
extended measures of unemployment reached double-digit figures. The Swedish performance 
seemed to have converged the European average.  
 
Although the prospects for a sustained labor market improvement appeared remote in the mid-
1990s, a strong recovery was in fact around the corner. From 1997 and onwards, employment 
exhibited a marked increase and unemployment fell precipitously. By the end of 2000, 
unemployment had reached 4 percent of the labor force and it remained fairly constant at this 
level during 2001 and 2002.  
 
Why did Swedish unemployment rise so sharply in the early 1990s and why did it decline 
during the end of the decade? Those are the main issues discussed in this paper. It is argued 
that the steep increase in unemployment in the early 1990s was mainly the result of a series of 
adverse macroeconomic shocks, partly self-inflicted by bad policies and partly caused by 
unfavorable international developments. The policy failures date back to the 1970s and 
include an inability to pursue a sufficiently restrictive aggregate demand policy so as to bring 
inflation under control. This inflationary bias in policy was especially pronounced in the late 
1980s when it was fueled by financial liberalization.    2
On the positive side, the inflationary bias of fiscal and monetary policies reflected a firm 
commitment to maintain full employment. If unemployment approached 3 percent, as it did in 
the early 1970s, this was considered to be a major policy failure. If it rose above 3 percent, as 
in the early 1980s, the policy failure was even worse. Although estimates of the NAIRU are 
fragile, it seems fairly clear that actual unemployment during the late 1980s was well below 
levels consistent with stable inflation.  
 
Even if macroeconomic shocks explain most of the steep rise in unemployment, other factors 
have caused some rise in the Swedish NAIRU since the 1960s and throughout the 1980s. A 
trend increase in the generosity of unemployment insurance is a case in point. During the 
1990s, however, unemployment insurance became less generous. Other factors, such as 
product market deregulations and innovations in wage bargaining, may also have contributed 
to some decline in equilibrium unemployment in recent years. 
 
We begin in Section 2 by describing the evolution of unemployment, its structure and its 
dynamic features. We also present some facts about how active labor market policies have 
responded to the turbulence of the 1990s. Section 3 of the paper discusses the causes of the 
increase in unemployment. There are a number of suspects, including macroeconomic shocks 
as well as structural changes that may have affected equilibrium unemployment. Section 4 
turns to a discussion of the fall in unemployment during the late 1990s and Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Evolution of Unemployment 
2.1 The Aggregate Picture 
The Swedish unemployment rate displayed modest fluctuations around an average level of 2 
percent during the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s.
1 A weak trend increase in unemployment 
could be identified, however. The recession of the early 1970s entailed higher unemployment 
than what was observed during the 1960s. Likewise, the early 1980s witnessed a recession 
where unemployment approached 4 percent, a level considered as exceptionally high by the 
                                                 
1 The unemployment figures that are used in this paper refer unless stated otherwise to labor force survey data 
and national definitions. The latter differ slightly from unemployment according to the definitions by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). In particular, students engaged in fulltime job search are classified as 
unemployed by ILO but as out of the labor force in the national definition. Labor force survey data are not 
available before the early 1960s. The working age population is generally confined to those aged 16 to 64.   3
standards of the 1960s and the 1970s. However, by the end of the 1980s the unemployment 
rate had reached a decade low of 1.1 percent (June 1989). 
 
The three decades from the early 1960s to the late 1980s also involved sharply rising female 
participation rates. In 1965, female participation in the labor force stood at 54 percent; in 1989 
it had risen to 82 percent. Male participation rates fell only modestly – from 89 to 86 percent 
between 1965 and 1989 – and the aggregate labor force participation rate thus rose 
dramatically. Employment increased in tandem with the increase in participation. By the late 
1980s, employment-to-population rates stood at 85 and 81 percent for males and females, 
respectively.  
 
The slump of the early 1990s involved a fall in the level of GDP from peak to trough by 6 
percent and produced an unprecedented increase in unemployment. Between 1990 and 1993, 
unemployment rose from 1.5 percent to 8.2 percent. The increase in unemployment was 
accompanied by a sharp decline in labor force participation among both men and women. The 
total decline in employment in the early 1990s amounted to around 500 000 persons, or a fall 
in the employment-to-population rate from 83 percent to 73 percent between 1990 and 1993.  
Over the period 1993 to 1997, the unemployment rate hovered around 8 percent whereas 
employment fell slightly (reaching 70.7 percent of population in 1997). However, a strong 
rebound began in 1997 and involved a rise in GDP growth and employment as well as a 
substantial fall in unemployment. By 2001 the unemployment rate had fallen to 4 percent and 
the employment-to-population rate had increased to 75 percent.  
 
The evolution of unemployment according to several measures is displayed in Figure 2.1 and 
Figure 2.2. The gap between “ILO unemployment” and the national measure in Figure 2.1 
consists of full-time students searching for a job. The ILO rate hit 10 percent in 1996 and 
1997 and had fallen to 5 percent in 2001. An extended measure of unemployment includes 
also those “latent job seekers” who are jobless, “willing and able” to work but do not meet the 
search criteria for being classified as unemployed.
2 This extended unemployment rate hit 12-
13 percent in the mid-1990s and had fallen below 7 percent by 2001. 
                                                 
2 The latent job seeker category comprises also full-time students (including persons in labor market training) 
that search for employment.    4
Figure 2.1 Official unemployment (Urate) and ILO unemployment  












Note: The ILO unemployment rate is based on a labor force measure that includes full-time 
students engaged in job search. 




Figure 2.2 Official unemployment (Urate) and latent job seekers (Latent),  














Notes: The labor force is computed as inclusive of latent job seekers. 
  Source: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden.   5
The average EU unemployment rate stood at around 11 percent in 1995 and had fallen to 8 
percent in 2000. The Swedish development is fairly similar to the UK experience over the 
second half of the 1990s. In both countries, unemployment has roughly been halved. In the 
Netherlands, another country arguably representing a success story, the decline in 
unemployment was even more striking; unemployment fell from around 7 percent in the mid 
1990s to less than 3 percent in 2000. The Dutch performance stands out even more if one 
looks at employment growth. Between 1996 and 2000, the employment-to-population rate 
rose by around 8 percentage points (from 65 to 73 percent). Employment growth in the UK 
was much more modest over the same period, amounting to a rise in the total employment-to-
population rate by around 2 percentage points.
3 
 
In summary, the early 1990s saw a rise in Swedish unemployment unprecedented during the 
post-war period. The recovery that took place from 1997 and onwards has brought about a 
substantial fall in unemployment as well as an increase in employment. These improvements 
are not exceptional by European standards, although probably above average. By earlier 
Swedish standards, however, the current (2002) unemployment rate of 4 percent is about 
twice as high as the average levels prevailing from the early 1960s and up to the late 1980s. 
Furthermore, the current overall employment-to-population rate is about 5 percentage points 
lower than during the late 1980s.  
 
2.2 The Structure of Unemployment 
The aggregate figures presented above hide considerable diversity in labor market outcomes 
across demographic and educational groups. However, a basic similarity across groups is that 
they were all affected by the slump: unemployment rose for all groups, albeit more for some 
groups than for others. We discuss outcomes for individuals categorized by gender, age, 
education and immigrant status. 
 
Age and Gender 
Table 2.1 presents unemployment rates by age and gender for some selected years. We also 
present nonemployment rates, defined as the number of nonemployed (unemployed plus 
nonparticipants) divided by the relevant population size. For youths, the nonemployment rates 
                                                 
3 See OECD Employment Outlook, various issues. Nickell and van Ours (2000) provide a comprehensive 
discussion of the evolution of unemployment in the Netherlands and the UK.   6
are highly sensitive to educational enrollment, including various labor market programs 
targeted at youths.  
 
The unemployment rate for youths aged 16-24 increased from less than 4 percent to over 15 
percent during the first half of the 1990s. In terms of percentage points, this increase was 
clearly much higher than the average increase. In proportional terms, however, the differences 
across age groups were fairly small. Roughly speaking, the slump brought about a rise in 
unemployment for all age groups by a factor of four to five. The overall rise was bigger for 
men than for women. Note that female unemployment rates were higher than the rates for 
men in the 1980s (and also earlier); the 1990s have seen a reversal of this ranking.  
 
Turning to nonemployment, the development for youths stands out with a rise by over 20 
percentage points between 1990 and 1995. This reflects to a large extent participation in labor 
market programs as well as increased enrollment in (general) education. The increases in 
nonemployment among prime-aged and older individuals are of fairly similar magnitudes. 
Note also that the increase in male nonemployment is slightly bigger than the increase in 
female nonemployment. The gender difference in nonemployment reached a minimum in 
1993, with a difference less than one percentage point. 
 
The recovery has led to a fall in unemployment and nonemployment for all groups. 
Interestingly, the fall in nonemployment was bigger for older individuals than for prime-aged 
ones. A nonemployment rate of 30 percent for older men, as in Sweden 2001, is very low by 
international standards; the OECD average was 40 percent and the EU average around 50 
percent in 2000 (see OECD Employment Outlook). A more detailed picture of the pattern of 
employment by age is shown in Figure 2.3 and confirms the relatively favorable outcomes for 
older workers. It is remarkable that the employment-to-population rate for the oldest group 
(60-64) is roughly the same in 2002 as it was in the mid 1980s, despite the slump of the 
1990s.  
 
Rising unemployment is clearly only one part of the increase in nonemployment, the other 
being rising nonparticipation. Table 2.2 provides a decomposition of nonemployment into a 
few major (self-reported) categories. Participation in labor market programs is not available as 
a separate category in the labor force surveys. Of the increase in total nonemployment 
between 1990 and 1995, amounting to 10.9 percentage points, rising unemployment accounts   7
for 4.6 percentage points or 42 percent. Unemployment accounts for around half of the total 
increase in nonemployment among prime-aged and older people, whereas it only accounts for 
about 20 percent of the increase in youth nonemployment. Activities classified as studies, 
which include various active labor market programs in addition to general education, account 
for about 20 percent of the increase in youth nonemployment.  
 
















           Source: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden. 
 
The 1990s have seen a marked increase in enrollment in higher education, which accounts for 
part of the increase nonemployment. Between 1993 and 1999, the number of undergraduate 
students rose by 25 percent, which amounts to roughly one percent of overall working age 
population and almost 10 percent of the population aged 20-24. A major educational drive for 
low-educated adults (Kunskapslyftet) was initiated in 1997 and encompassed 2 percent of the 
working age population by the end of that year.  
   8
 
Table 2.1 Unemployment and nonemployment rates by age and gender (percent). 
 
 1980 
u                  n 
1985 
u                  n 
1990 
u                  n 
1995 
u                  n 
2001 
u                  n 
Total              
16-24 5.1 32.7 5.8 37.8  3.7  34.0  15.3  57.6 8.0 52.1 
25-54 1.4 11.9 1.9  9.7  1.2  8.4  6.6 17.4 3.3 15.4 
55-64 1.6 34.3 4.0 35.0  1.5  30.6 7.4 38.1 4.2 33.0 
16-64 2.0 20.1 2.8 19.7  1.6  16.9 7.7 27.8 4.0 24.7 
              
Men              
16-24 4.5 31.7 5.8 38.2  3.8  33.9  16.7  58.2 9.1 52.7 
25-54 1.1 5.7  2.0  6.7  1.3  6.5  7.2 16.0 3.5 13.3 
55-64 1.6 22.6 3.5 26.7  1.3  25.6 8.4 35.6 4.6 30.4 
16-64 1.7 13.8 2.8 16.4  1.7  14.8 8.5 26.5 4.3 23.0 
              
Women              
16-24 5.6 33.8 5.7 37.4  3.6  34.1  14.0  57.1 6.8 51.5 
25-54 1.6 18.4 1.9 12.8  1.2  10.3 5.9 18.9 3.0 17.5 
55-64 1.6 45.6 4.6 42.9  1.6  35.2 6.3 40.5 3.8 35.7 
16-64 2.3 26.6 2.9 23.1  1.6  19.0 6.9 29.2 3.6 26.5 
Note: The unemployment rate (u) is measured relative to the labor force, the nonemployment rate (n) relative to population. 
Source: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden.   9
Table 2.2 Nonemployment by type of (in)activity, percent of population. 
 
 1990 
16-24      25-54     55-64        16-64 
 
1995 
16-24    25-54      55-64     16-64 
2001 



























                    
Students 26.3  1.9  0.1  6.4  39.5  3.3  0.3  9.3  37.2  4.1  0.8  8.9 
                    
Household 
work 
1.1  1.8 5.3  2.2 1.1  1.6  2.4  1.6  0.7 1.0 0.8 0.9 
                    
Other 4.1  3.6  24.2  6.9  9.3  6.7  30.5  10.8  10.0  7.4  28.5  11.7 
                    
                    
Total 
nonemployment 
34.0  8.4  30.6  16.9 57.6  17.4  38.1  27.8  52.1 15.4 33.0 24.7 
                    
Note: The “other” category includes individuals receiving early retirement pensions and other pensions as well as people in long term sickness.  
Source: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden. 
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A significant fraction of nonparticipation involves “inactivity” associated with early 
retirement, receipt of disability pensions and long-term sickness. Information on these 
categories is not available on a consistent basis in the labor force surveys. There is 
nevertheless strong evidence, from the labor force surveys and other sources, that 
nonparticipation for various disability and sickness-related reasons has increased over the 
1990s. The residual category “other” includes, among other things, persons in long-term 
sickness or with disability pensions. This category rose by 4 percentage points between 1990 
and 1995 and accounts for over a third of the increase in total nonemployment. For older 
workers, the category accounts for over 80 percent of the increase. Note that there is a rise in 
the “other” group also between 1995 and 2001, despite generally improving labor market 
conditions. 
 
Labor force survey information on nonparticipation involving long-term sickness or pension 
receipt (including early retirements) is available for some years. In 1990, around 5 percent of 
the population belonged to the sickness/pension category. By 2001, this group had increased 
to 7.7 percent. Register data on the number of persons receiving early retirement benefits 
reveal an increase in the number of retirees by close to 20 percent between 1990 and 2000, or 
a rise from 6.8 to 7.8 percent of the working age population (according to data from the 
National Social Insurance Board). 
 
The rules pertaining to early retirements have undergone several changes since the early 
1990s. The basic qualification rule is based on health conditions. However, it has also been 
possible for older workers (aged 60-64) to qualify for early retirement pension for labor 
market reasons, i.e., difficulties of finding a job. Before October 1991, labor market reason 
could be a sufficient condition. From October 1991 and through January 1997, it was possible 
to qualify for labor market reasons if certain health conditions were also met. From February 
1997, labor market reasons are no longer part of the eligibility conditions. There have also 
been changes in the rules concerning health conditions. A reform in 1993 made the 
qualification criteria more stringent. These rules have been slightly moderated by new 
legislation in place from 1999 and onwards. 
 
The bottom line of all this is that the rules pertaining to sickness benefits, early retirements 
and disability pensions are likely to have important implications for how labor market shocks 
affect nonemployment in general, and nonparticipation in particular. A reasonable conjecture   11
is that even transitory adverse shocks can have permanent effects on nonemployment if the 
rules favor labor force withdrawals.  
 
Education 
It is a general phenomenon that unemployment is higher for those with relatively low 
education than for those with higher education. Sweden is no exception in this regard. Table 
2.3 shows unemployment and nonemployment rates by educational categories. 
Unemployment rates for those with low education are roughly two to three times as high as 
unemployment among those with university education. The increase in unemployment during 
the early 1990s affected all education groups. Unemployment rates increased for all education 
categories by a factor of five to six. 
 
Immigrants 
Over 10 percent of the total population currently living in Sweden was born abroad. Around 6 
percent of the working age population in 2001 had a foreign citizenship, whereas the share of 
foreigners in the labor force was around 5 percent. Unemployment among immigrants is 
generally higher, sometimes dramatically higher, than unemployment among native Swedes. 
Table 2.4 gives some data on unemployment and nonemployment rates for foreigners and for 
the whole labor force.
4 Unemployment and nonemployment among immigrants vary 
tremendously by country of origin. Among non-Nordic citizens, the unemployment rate rose 
from 5 to 30 percent between 1990 and 1995, whereas nonemployment rose from 34 to 64 
percent during the same period.  
 
The labor market recovery has led to substantial reductions in nonemployment among 
immigrants. This is confirmed in detail in a recent study by Nelander and Goding (2003). For 
example, the unemployment rate fell from 41 to 10 percent between 1997 and 2002 among 
non-European men with less than ten years of residence in Sweden.  
 
                                                 
4 The regular labor force surveys contain no information on unemployment among immigrants with Swedish 
citizenship.    12
 
Table 2.3 Unemployment and nonemployment by education, age 25-54 (percent). 
 
 1980 
u                  n 
1985 
u                  n 
1990 
u                  n 
1995 
u                  n 
2001 
u                  n 
              
Compulsory  2.0 16.0 3.1 15.5  1.5  9.4  8.7 18.7 4.7 24.1 
              
High  school  1.2 9.6  2.0  9.1  1.3  6.4  7.5 15.5 3.6 14.7 
              
University  0.7 6.1  1.0  4.2  0.8  4.6  3.7 10.0 2.2 11.6 
              
              
Note: The unemployment rate (u) is measured relative to the labor force, the nonemployment rate (n) relative to population. 
Source: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden. 
 
 
              Table 2.4 Unemployment and nonemployment among foreign citizens. 
 
 1990 
u                  n 
1995 
u                  n 
2001 
u                  n 
         
Nordic  2.5  21.2 12.2 37.3  6.6  35.6 
         
Other  5.0  33.8 30.0 64.2 13.0 46.3 
         
Total  foreign  3.9  28.5 22.7 55.3 10.6 42.6 















          
Note: The unemployment rate (u) is measured relative to the labor force, the nonemployment rate (n)  
relative to population. 
Source: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden. 
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2.3 The Dynamics of Unemployment 
Inflow and Duration 
Although Swedish unemployment changed relatively little over the period up until the early 
1990s, the average duration of unemployment spells showed a trend increase. In the late 
1960s, the average duration of (completed) unemployment spells hovered around 7 weeks; by 
the mid-1980s, the average duration had increased to 16 weeks. Since unemployment did not 
change much, it follows that unemployment inflow exhibited a substantial trend decline 
between the 1960s and the 1980s; see Table 2.5. The slump of the 1990s has completely 
reversed the trend decline in unemployment inflow. The inflow rate tripled in the early 1990s 
and has shown only a modest decline during the recovery in the late 1990s. In fact, most of 
the increase in unemployment can be accounted for by a rise in the inflow rather than by a rise 
in duration.  
 
Table 2.5 Unemployment inflow and unemployment duration, age 16–64. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 u  f    D 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1965–1969  1.8  0.27    6.8 
1970–1974 2.2  0.19  11.5 
1975–1979 1.9  0.17  11.5 
1980–1984 2.9  0.19  15.5 
1985–1986 2.7  0.17  15.5 
1987–1988 1.8  0.12  14.5 
1989–1990 1.5  0.10  13.8 
1991–1992 3.7  0.18  20.6 
1993-1995 8.0  0.34  23.5 
1996-1998 7.5  0.31  24.2 
1999-2001 4.7  0.30  15.9 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: u is the unemployment rate (percent), f the weekly inflow into unemployment as percent of the 
labor force, and D the average duration of completed spells of unemployment. D is obtained from the 
steady state relationship uf D = i . 
           Source: Computations based on data on u and f from the labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden. 
 
It should be kept in mind that labor force exits account for a considerable share of exits from 
unemployment. During the 1990s, this share accounted for some 40 percent according to the 
panels of the labor force surveys (Holmund and Storrie, 2001). Register data from the   14
employment offices indicate a labor force withdrawal share of around 50 percent (Carling et 
al, 2001). Labor market programs account for a substantial fraction of the labor force 
withdrawals. The average duration of joblessness is thus substantially higher than the average 
duration of (open) unemployment spells.
5 
 
The panel structure of the labor force surveys makes it possible to measure labor market flows 
and compute transition rates.
6 Figure 2.4 shows job finding rates for unemployed workers 
(UE) as well as job loss rates, i.e., transition rates from employment to unemployment (EU). 
The steep rise in unemployment during the first years of the 1990s was associated with both a 
rise in the probability of job loss and a decline in the probability of job finding. Likewise, the 
recovery during the late 1990s involved marked improvements in job finding rates and 
reductions in the risk of entering unemployment. 
 
The increase in unemployment inflow is in part also driven by a steep increase in the inflow 
from nonparticipation. The mere fact that the size of the pool of nonparticipants is much 
larger in the slump contributes to this development. In addition, the data reveal some increase 
in the probability of entering unemployment from nonparticipation; see Figure 2.5. The 
pattern is as expected: the worse the labor market conditions are, the lower the probability of 
making a “successful” labor market entry.  
 
All in all, the data suggest that the main “mechanical” cause of the rise in Swedish 
unemployment is the dramatic increase in unemployment inflow that took place in the early 
1990s. This development coincided with a steep increase in job destruction, as is revealed in 
studies by Andersson (1999), Persson (1999) and Arai and Heyman (2002); this is bound to 
have triggered a rise in the inflow from employment. Those studies also indicate a modest 
decline in job creation in the early 1990s, something that probably reinforced the rise in 
unemployment inflow by making it generally more difficult for workers to locate a (new) job 




                                                 
5 The importance of labor force exits is certainly not a unique Swedish phenomenon driven exclusively by active 
labor market programs. For example, data on US labor force transitions reported in Clark and Summers (1979) 
reveal that almost half of all unemployment spells ended by labor force withdrawal.  
6 Respondents remain in the survey for two years and are interviewed every third month. Holmlund and Vejsiu 
(2001) contain a detailed presentation of the aggregate features of these flow data.   15
Figure 2.4 Job finding rates (UE) and job loss rates (EU) 1987-2002.  


















Source: The transition rates are computed from the quarterly panels of the labor force surveys. 
 
Figure 2.5 Transitions between unemployment (U) and out of the labor force (O) 1987-2002. 
Seasonally adjusted data. 












Source: The transition rates are computed from the quarterly panels of the labor force surveys.  
 
Job Finding by Elapsed Duration 
To what extent did the labor market recovery benefit short-term and long-term unemployed? 
We take a brief look at this issue by means of data from the public employment offices. 
Figure 2.6 shows job finding rates among (“openly”) unemployed individuals with varying   16
lengths of elapsed duration of joblessness. Duration is measured as time registered at the 
employment office, irrespective of whether registration time has been spent in open 
unemployment or in a labor market program. It is notable that the recovery is associated with 
increased job finding among all duration categories. The rising economic tides could 
apparently lift out of joblessness also those who had remained there for a very long time. 
 



































Note: Elapsed duration in joblessness includes open unemployment as well as participation in active 
labor market programs.  
Source: Computations by Anders Harkman, the National Labor Market Board. 
 
2.4 Active Labor Market Policies 
In an international perspective, Sweden stands out as a country that spends large resources on 
active labor market policy (ALMP). The policy has a long history. Two trade union 
economists, Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, laid out the intellectual foundations in the late 
1940s. To them, ALMP was an integral part of a program emphasizing full employment, 
“solidarity” wage policy and rapid structural change. The key purpose of ALMP was to 
facilitate productivity-enhancing sectoral labor reallocation. This emphasis on labor 
reallocation and structural change called for mobility subsidies, employment services to 
improve matching, and manpower training. ALMP as practiced in Sweden over the past 
couple of decades has also involved various forms of subsidized employment. Those have 
traditionally taken the form of “relief jobs” (temporary public jobs). In recent years, relief 
jobs have disappeared and other recruitment subsidies have been introduced. For example,   17
subsidies are paid to employers that hire long-term unemployed (with the going wage paid to 
those hired). Subsidized employment also includes subsidies to unemployed individuals that 
wish to start their own businesses. 
 
ALMP-volumes have been gradually expanded from the early 1960s and onwards. By the late 
1970s, the number of participants in ALMPs had increased to 2 percent relative to the labor 
force.
7 These programs mainly consisted of manpower training and relief jobs. As is clear 
from Figure 2.7, ALMPs were markedly countercyclical, rising in recessions and falling in 
booms. This countercyclical pattern was especially pronounced for relief jobs.
8 
 
Figure 2.7 The number of participants in active labor market programs,  
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  Sources: The National Labor Market Board (programs) and Statistics Sweden (labor force). 
 
The 1990s have seen a large number of new programs, often targeted at unemployed youths. 
The slump in the early 1990s was initially met by a steep increase in the volume of training 
programs, later to be followed by an expansion of subsidized employment and “youth 
practice” programs. The high rate of policy innovations in this area reflects to some degree a 
re-labeling of existing types of programs rather than substantive news. Be that as it may, it is 
plausible that the extensive ALMP measures have lowered open unemployment relative to 
                                                 
7 Most program participants are classified as being outside the labor force but we follow the common practice of 
measuring ALMP relative to the labor force (as measured by the labor force surveys). 
8 Edin and Holmlund (1991) estimated that an increase in the number of unemployed by 10 000 was associated 
with an increase in relief jobs by 5 000.    18
what would have been achieved without the policies. Whether or not the policies have 
contributed to higher employment is less clear. 
 
3. Why Did Unemployment Rise?  
What caused the dramatic increase in unemployment in the early 1990s? The Swedish 
experience has similarities to what happened in Finland during the same period although the 
Finnish slump was deeper than the Swedish one. For both countries one could argue, along 
the lines of Honkapohja and Koskela (1999), that the slump was mainly driven by a 
combination of bad policies and bad luck. Finland had clearly more bad luck than Sweden 
since it lost an important part of its export market through the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
 
The exposition that follows provides a partly chronological account of the events that led to 
skyrocketing unemployment. We begin by discussing the shocks that hit the economy, some 
of them largely self-inflicted and others more exogenous to domestic policies. Some of the 
shocks were mainly affecting fluctuations in unemployment around the equilibrium rate 
whereas other shocks may also have influenced equilibrium unemployment.
9 
 
3.1 The Shocks that Hit 
Stabilization Policy in Turmoil
10  
For most of the 20
th century, Sweden pursued a fixed exchange rate policy. After the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, the Swedish krona was first pegged to the 
D-mark (via the “currency snake”) and from 1977 to 1991 to a trade-weighted basket of 
foreign currencies. A crucial requirement for the feasibility of the fixed-exchange regime was, 
of course, that domestic inflation was kept in line with inflation abroad. This turned out to 
become increasingly difficult and a series of devaluations took place in the late 1970s and the 
early 1980s. These devaluations resulted in substantial (albeit temporary) improvements in 
competitiveness that counteracted the adverse employment effects of unsustainable inflation. 
The large devaluations in the early 1980s paved the way for an employment expansion that 
lasted throughout the decade, reinforced by an international upswing as well as expansionary 
domestic policies. However, the expansionary domestic policies during the 1980s carried the 
seeds that ultimately led to a complete regime shift in stabilization policy in the early 1990s. 
                                                 
9 Johansson et al (1999) include a detailed discussion of the nature of Swedish unemployment in the 1990s. 
10 The section draws on a variety of sources, including material from Konjunkturinstitutet (the National Institute 
of Economic Research) and OECD Economic Surveys.    19
 
The credit market was one important source of domestic demand expansion. By the end of 
1985, Swedish financial markets had been largely deregulated. Restrictions on household 
loans in commercial banks and credit institutions had been lifted, which set in motion a rapid 
increase in bank loans to the household sector. This change took place during a period when 
marginal tax rates were generally high and when mortgage payments were deductible in 
income taxation. The interaction of financial deregulation, progressive taxes and generous 
rules for deducting interest payments created the preconditions for a strong credit expansion. 
The total credit volume increased at an annual rate of almost 20 percent during 1985-1990. 
The consumption boom that followed involved a fall in the household saving rate to minus 5 
percent of disposable income in 1988 and a gradual build-up of household debt.  
 
The surge in aggregate demand contributed to a fall in unemployment along with a gradual 
increase in inflation. By the end of the 1980s, unemployment was approaching 1 percent of 
the labor force. Monetary policy was tied to defending the fixed exchange rate and fiscal 
policy was too lax to prevent the rise in inflationary pressure. 
 
During the late 1980s, a government committee developed a far-reaching proposal for reform 
of the Swedish tax system. Key elements were lower marginal tax rates on labor earnings and 
the introduction of a dual system of income taxation with a 30 percent tax rate on income 
from capital. Mortgage payments could then be deducted at 30 percent. These reforms were 
put into practice in 1990 and 1991 and caused a marked increase in after-tax real interest 
rates. The demand for owner-occupied housing fell predictably; between 1990 and 1993, the 
fall in real prices amounted to 30 percent. It has been estimated that approximately half of the 
fall in real prices can be explained by the tax reform (Agell et al, 1995). On top of this, the 
household saving rate rose from minus 5 percent in 1988 to plus 7 percent in 1992. The rise in 
saving reflected households’ attempts to bring down a debt-to-income ratio that had shown a 
marked increase over the 1980s, especially during the second half of the decade.  
 
In this environment, Swedish stabilization policy took close to a U-turn. The prime objective 
for decades had been full employment, although the desirability of low inflation was 
recognized in words. In practice, this has led governments to undertake several devaluations 
in the late 1970s and the early 1980s so as to restore competitiveness that had been eroded by 
high inflation and fixed exchange rates. In the early 1990s, the government declared that low   20
inflation was the prime objective of stabilization policy. A unilateral affiliation of the krona to 
the ECU was declared in May 1991. The stated intention was to rule out future devaluations 
as escape routes from unsustainable inflation and loss of competitiveness.  
 
In addition to self-inflicted wounds, Swedish policy making was also hit by bad luck in the 
early 1990s. An international recession struck during the first years of the decade. Industrial 
production declined between 1990 and 1993 by 4-5 percent in the EU area and by over 6 
percent in Germany. The general weakening of major Swedish export markets added to the 
falling demand for Swedish exports and reinforced the sharp decline in GDP.  
 
During the Fall of 1992, the krona was put under a number of speculative attacks and it 
became increasingly doubtful whether the fixed exchange rate was sustainable. In November 
1992, the fixed exchange regime had to be abandoned and the krona was floating. A new 
monetary regime was established, including an inflationary target (from early 1993) and a 
more independent central bank (from the late 1990s).  
 
The chronological tale told so far emphasizes two main policy failures. First, it is clear that 
fiscal policy was too lax in the second half of the 1980s. Unemployment reached levels 
clearly below available estimates of the NAIRU.
11 The fixed exchange rate target had tied the 
hands of monetary policy and only fiscal policy tools were available to combat rising 
inflationary pressure. Second, it is also clear that the timing of financial deregulation and tax 
reform was less than optimal. Under more ideal circumstances, the tax reform should have 
preceded financial liberalization, rather than the other way around. Had the financial 
liberalization taken place in an environment with less favorable conditions for household 
loans, the effects on credit demand and private consumption would have been smaller.  
 
These claims appear fairly uncontroversial, although the fine details of the impact of financial 
deregulation and tax reform are debatable.
12 More controversial is an assessment of the policy 
stance vis-à-vis the emerging slump in the early 1990s. A less stubborn defense of the krona 
had surely cushioned the downturn and led to a less dramatic rise in unemployment. However, 
                                                 
11 Estimates in Holmlund (1993a) indicated a trend increase in the Swedish NAIRU since the mid-1960s. 
According to these estimates, NAIRU was close to 3 percent around 1990, about twice as large as actual 
unemployment during 1989-90.  
12 One influential view was that the existing regulations had been undone by the “grey” credit market and that a 
formal deregulation would have little effect on credit volumes. Cf. the exchange between Wohlin (1998) and 
Englund (1998).   21
if one takes the view that inflation carries substantial costs, its extinction is presumably worth 
substantial costs as well. To take a stand on this issue, one has to make an assessment of the 
social costs (and benefits) of inflation and unemployment.  
 
Climbing Real Interest Rates 
The rise in real after-tax interest rates in the early 1990s had essentially three sources, namely 
the international rise in interest rates, the tax reform that raised after-tax rates, and the steep 
fall in inflation. These developments triggered a decline in aggregate demand in general and 
housing demand in particular. However, higher real interest rates can also have “supply side” 
effects via firms’ behavior. In particular, changes in real interest rates can influence 
equilibrium unemployment through the effects on the demand for labor. In the matching 
model of Pissarides (2000), for example, a higher real interest rate effectively works as a tax 
on new hires; hiring a worker carries an up-front recruitment cost and a higher rate of interest 
makes the “investment” in a new worker less profitable.  
 
Swedish real interest rates exhibited a marked increase over the period 1989-92. According to 
one measure, the rates went up from 4 percent to double-digit figures.
13 However, interest 
rates fell sharply when the fixed exchange rate regime was abandoned in November 1992. 
The empirical evidence on the relationships between real interest rates and unemployment is 
not conclusive and it is difficult to assess quantitatively how the interest rate shocks affected 
employment. It is safe to argue, however, that the interest rate hikes reinforced other adverse 
shocks that hit the Swedish economy in the early 1990s, thereby aggravating the fall in 
employment. Some back-of-the-envelopes calculations in Edin and Holmund (1997) suggest 
that the rise in the real interest rate that took place could translate into a non-negligible 
increase in equilibrium unemployment. 
 
Falling Public Sector Employment  
Public sector employment in Sweden expanded rapidly from the early 1960s to the mid 1980s. 
The major increases took place during the 1970s where public employment increased by 4-5 
percent per year, most of it in local governments. By the end of the 1980s, the number of 
public-sector employees accounted for 40 percent of the total wage and salary employment. In 
the early 1990s, however, the rise in public employment came to a sharp halt. In fact, between 
                                                 
13 The figures are based on nominal interest rates for 3 months treasury bills and the producer price index.   22
1990 and 1994, the number of public sector employees declined by 15 percent, or by around 
250 000 persons. This was equivalent to a decline in employment relative to population of 5 
percentage points. Figure 3.1 shows how public employment has evolved since the late 1970s.  
 
It is likely that this apparently dramatic fall in public sector employment overstates the 
amount of job destruction that actually took place. The 1990s witnessed much organizational 
restructuring and privatization and some of the decline in public sector employment reflects 
these organizational changes rather than job destruction. However, the organizational changes 
that took place may also have increased competitive pressure and involved some initial 
shakeout of labor.  
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           Source: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden. 
 
To assess the impact of public sector employment on unemployment one has to distinguish 
between the short run and the long run. The short run (impact) effect on actual unemployment 
is likely to differ from the long run effect on equilibrium unemployment. Moreover, changes 
in public employment may in itself be endogenous to movements in unemployment. Indeed, 
public employment displayed a countercyclical pattern in Sweden during the 1960s and the 
1970s (and to some degree also during the 1980s); see Edin and Holmlund (1994). This being 
said, one can still with reasonable confidence sign the impact effect of cutbacks of public   23
employment. The fall in public employment in the early 1990s almost certainly contributed to 
the rise in unemployment.  
 
An assessment of the long-run effect of public sector employment on unemployment is more 
difficult. Clearly, a rise in public employment financed by taxes is likely to induce some 
crowding out of private sector employment. Theoretical models in this area include papers by 
Holmlund (1993, 1997) and Algan et al (2002). A plausible benchmark case is where the long 
run effect on unemployment is zero. In a standard model of decentralized bargaining between 
unions and employers, this long run neutrality result holds if the bargaining power of unions 
does not differ between private and public sectors.  
 
Empirical studies in this area face difficult problems of identifying the causal effects of public 
employment on unemployment. The studies are few and the results are mixed. For example, 
Edin and Holmlund (1997) could not find any long run effect although they did find a 
negative and significant short run effect. Algan et al (2002) report results that are somewhat 
sensitive to the exact specification; their preferred estimates suggest that an expansion of 
public employment would actually increase unemployment in the long run.  
 
Summing up, the early 1990s saw a number of adverse shocks to employment. In addition to 
the shocks affecting private-sector employment, there was also a marked decline in public 
sector labor demand. Although the long run effect of public sector contraction may well be 
negligible, the short run impact almost certainly reinforced the steep rise in unemployment. 
 
3.2 Work Hours, Absenteeism and Cyclical Unemployment 
The extent to which adverse shocks to labor demand have immediate effects on employment 
and unemployment depends on the costs of adjusting work hours as well as the number of 
workers. Flexible work hours can to a degree function as an adjustment margin that reduces 
fluctuations in employment. In Sweden, however, average hours per worker are 
countercyclical.  
 
Why do actual work hours exhibit this behavior? Rules pertaining to unemployment insurance 
(UI) and temporary layoffs are part of the explanation. Consider first the role of UI. A decline 
in labor demand that is met by layoffs – full time unemployment for those laid off – is 
associated with UI payments to the affected workers. On the other hand, if the decline is met   24
by work sharing – part-time unemployment for all workers – there will be no benefits 
available to compensate for the income loss. The UI rules thus effectively discourage work 
sharing as a device to cope with adverse shocks.  
 
The rules pertaining to temporary layoffs (permitteringar) have similar effects. A worker 
temporarily laid off, while retaining his employment contract with the firm, is classified as 
absent from work in the labor force surveys and is eligible for temporary layoff pay. This 
layoff pay equals the worker’s regular earnings and is (mainly) provided by the firm 
responsible for the layoff. In other words, stiff experience rating effectively penalizes 
temporary layoffs.  
 
Another factor of importance is absence behavior over the business cycle. A notable feature of 
Swedish absenteeism is its marked pro-cyclicality. In 1990, the fraction of employed absent 
from work during a whole week was on average close to 18 percent; in the mid-1990s, 
absenteeism had fallen to 14 percent; see Figure 3.2. An important element of this pattern is 
pro-cyclical sick absenteeism. It is debatable to which extent pro-cyclical sick absence reflects 
fluctuations in the composition of the workforce as opposed to true behavioral effects, i.e., the 
disciplining effect of high unemployment. The presumption is that both mechanisms are at 
work.  
 
Pro-cyclical absenteeism reinforces the negative employment effects of adverse shocks to 
labor demand. Symmetrically, it reinforces the positive employment effects of favorable 
shocks. When absenteeism falls, there is less need to hire new workers to replace those absent 
from work. Analogously, there is more need to hire replacement workers when absenteeism 
increases. The magnitude of the potential employment effect is non-trivial. As shown in 
Figure 3.3, there is a marked rise in hours per employed worker during the early 1990s. The 
rise of about 4 percent can be taken as a rough indication of the magnitude of the potential 
employment effect. If hours and workers were perfect substitutes in production, and absent 
fixed costs per worker, a rise in work hours by 4 percent would translate into a decline in 
employment by approximately 4 percent. Of course, the actual effect is lower because of 
imperfect substitutability and fixed costs. However, the magnitude of the potential effect is 
substantial. The introduction of liberal rules for temporary work agencies (see below) may 
also have reduced the costs of using replacement workers, thus effectively increasing the 
substitutability between workers and work hours.    25
Figure 3.2 Absence rates among employed workers 1987-2002, percent. 
























  Note: The measures refer to absence during a whole week, all employed workers.  





Figure 3.3 Average hours of work per week 1987 –2002.  

















































  Note: The seasonally adjusted data have been smoothed by a three-quarter moving average. 
  Source: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden. 
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To conclude, it is clear that movements of work hours do not tend to offset the employment 
effects of adverse shocks to labor demand. By contrast, countercyclical work hours tend to 
reinforce the adverse effects on employment. In all likelihood, the decline in absenteeism, and 
associated rise in work hours, contributed to the rise in unemployment in the early 1990s.
14 
 
3.3 Other Suspects 
We have emphasized macroeconomic shocks as main explanations of why unemployment 
rose so sharply in the 1990s. For completeness, a few other candidate explanations need to be 
addressed. They belong to the group of usual suspects when one considers determinants of 
equilibrium unemployment. However, it is difficult to convincingly prove the guilt of any of 
these suspects.  
 
Unions and Wage Bargaining 
A high degree of unionization is a fundamental ingredient of what has been referred to as the 
Swedish Model. Labor legislation is based on the presumption that the overwhelming 
majority of workers belong to a union. Indeed, union density has hovered above and around 
80 percent of the number of employees over the past couple of decades. The coverage of 
collective agreements is even higher. The shocks that kicked Sweden into a major slump had 
nothing to do with a sudden surge in union density. In fact, union density declined slightly – 
from 82 to 80 percent – between 1987 and 1990 (Kjellberg, 2001). 
 
An arguably more promising explanation focuses on changes in wage bargaining systems. 
The heydays of centralized wage bargaining in Sweden were the period 1956-1983, which 
involved nationwide negotiations between the peak employee and employer organizations. 
This system came under increasing stress during the late 1970s when some employer 
organizations argued that the central frame agreements left too little room for flexibility at the 
local and industry level. A significant step towards more decentralized wage bargaining came 
in 1983, when the metalworkers’ union and their employer counterpart sidestepped the 
national negotiations and opted for an industry agreement. Wage negotiations after 1983 have 
mainly taken place at the industry level, albeit with some exceptions.  
 
                                                 
14 The argument presupposes that these changes in work hours had negligible effects on hourly wages. As is well 
known, some types of working time changes can influence wage determination (Hunt, 1999; Nordström Skans, 
2002). In the short run, however, one can reasonably take hourly wages as given.   27
It is possible that the breakdown of centralized bargaining contributed to some increase in 
wage pressure and made it more difficult to curtail inflation in the late 1980s. It seems 
unlikely, however, that the impact was strong. In fact, when the slump was underway, wage 
bargaining reverted temporarily to a highly centralized arrangement. The government initiated 
a nationwide incomes policy for 1991-93 so as to bring inflation under control. This policy 
involved coordination to an unusual degree, incorporating virtually all employer organizations 
and most of the unions.  
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that recent econometric evidence reveals a remarkable stability of 
Swedish wage setting relationships. The available studies find no evidence of structural 
breaks in the early 1990s (Forslund and Kolm, 2000; Holden and Nymoen, 2002; Nymoen 
and Rødseth, 2003).  
 
Unemployment Insurance 
Sweden has a generous UI system where pre-tax replacement rates for eligible workers have 
reached 90 percent during some years. Although the system is voluntary, it is heavily subsidized 
and its coverage has shown a trend increase. On average some 65 percent of the stock of 
unemployed registered at the public employment offices received UI during 1990-1995 (see 
SOU 1996:51, p. 51). The fraction of new spells of unemployment covered by UI was even 
lower. Carling et al (1996) report that less than 50 percent of the inflow of new unemployed 
received regular UI compensation in the early 1990s.  
 
Unemployment benefits cover a fraction of previous earnings up to a ceiling. The average 
replacement rate for a population of workers is thus based on the statutory replacement rate 
(up to the benefit ceiling) as well as the ceiling. The development of average replacement 
rates has shown a trend increase from the early 1960s to the 1980s (Björklund and Holmlund, 
1991; Forslund and Kolm, 2000). In the late 1980s, average replacement rates hovered around 
85-90 percent. Although benefit payments were formally limited to 60 weeks for most 
workers, the practice of allowing qualification through labor market programs effectively 
increased maximum duration substantially. 
 
The trend increase in the generosity of UI is a prime candidate explanation of the trend 
increase in the duration of unemployment between 1960s and the 1980s. However, it is 
difficult to identify specific sharp changes of UI around 1990 that could explain the rise in   28
unemployment in the early 1990s. It might perhaps be argued that the existence of a generous 
benefit system reinforced the rise in unemployment, even if the rise was ultimately caused by 
adverse macroeconomic shocks; this is the interaction argument discussed by Blanchard and 
Wolfers (2000). There are two problems with this argument, however. First, generous benefits 
strengthen the automatic stabilizers in the economy, thus reducing the adverse employment 
effects of recessionary shocks. Second, absent changes in institutions it is virtually impossible 
to identify empirically these interaction effects from data pertaining to a single country. 
 
Taxes 
The period from the early 1960s to the late 1980s exhibited an almost monotonic rise in the 
total tax pressure. The total tax wedge, including direct and indirect taxes on workers and 
payroll taxes on employers, increased by over 50 percent over this period.
15 The fact that 
unemployment remained low strongly suggests that most of these tax increases were borne by 
labor in the form of slower growth of real take-home pay. A marked trend reversal took place 
in the early 1990s and involved base broadening and lower marginal tax rates. It was certainly 
not a sharp rise in the tax wedge that threw Sweden into mass unemployment in the early 
1990s. 
 
The fact that the tax reform substantially reduced tax progressivity raises the possibility that 
this reform added to wage pressure by reducing the costs of wage increases. Some theory as 
well as some empirical work suggests that progressive taxes may bring about wage 
moderation when there is bargaining over wages. Holmlund and Kolm (1995) use their 
estimated wage pressure effects in some back-of-the envelopes calculations and find that the 
decline in tax progressivity between 1989 and 1992 may have raised equilibrium 
unemployment by around one percentage point. The empirical evidence on wage behavior and 
tax progressivity is somewhat mixed, however. For example, Forslund and Kolm (2000) 
cannot confirm that lower progressivity increases wage pressure. 
 
Matching 
Was the rise in unemployment driven by an increase in mismatch between job searchers and 
vacancies, by a general deterioration in matching efficiency, or by a fall in search effort? If 
                                                 
15 The measure of the total tax wedge is  (1 )(1 ) /(1 ) s vat t θ =+ + − , where s is the payroll tax rate (levied on 
firms), vat is the value added tax and t is the income tax paid by workers. See Forslund and Kolm (2000) for 
more information about the evolution of tax wedge.   29
any of these changes were important, we should observe outward shifts of the Beveridge 
curve. Figure 3.4 shows Beveridge scatter-plots for unemployment and vacancy rates.
16 The 
rise in unemployment seems to be best characterized as a movement along a convex 
Beveridge curve rather than as a shift of the curve.  
 
Recall that the increasing unemployment in the early 1990s was associated with a sharp 
increase in the inflow to unemployment, a fact that by itself produces an outward shift of the 
Beveridge curve. To gauge the importance of the inflow effect we have estimated a simple 
“u,v-model” that controls for the inflow rate.
17 Figure 3.5 illustrates an “inflow constant” 
Beveridge curve that is generated by a dynamic simulation from 1985 with the inflow rate 
fixed at its 1985 value. The outward loop is much less marked in this figure than in Figure 
3.4, confirming the importance of the inflow effect.  
 





























                                                 
16 The vacancy data refer to the number of unfilled vacancies at the public employment service.  
17 The estimated model is: ln u = 0.154-0.39 ln v-1 – 0.49 ln (v/v-1)+ 0.53 ln u-1 +0.34 ln iu, where u is the official 
unemployment rate (%), v the number of unfilled vacancies relative to the labor force (%,), and iu the weekly 
unemployment inflow relative to the labor force (%). Estimation period: 1977-2001, annual data. Adjusted R-
squared is 0.992, DW 1.780, SE 0.054 and AR(1) 0.36.   30
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Summing up, the rise in unemployment in the early 1990s cannot easily be attributed to 
deteriorating matching efficiency or an increase in mismatch. Nor can it plausibly be 
attributed to a sudden fall in search effort since it is hard to identify sharp adverse changes in 
the incentive structure. In fact, one could argue that the major tax reform of 1990-91 should 
have encouraged labor market participation and perhaps job search activity. 
 
Demographic Changes 
Did changes in the age composition of the labor force contribute to the rise in unemployment? 
Unemployment and nonemployment vary substantially across age groups, in Sweden as 
elsewhere. If a group with a high “natural” unemployment rate becomes relatively larger, 
there is a presumption that overall unemployment will increase. A simple shift share analysis 
can shed light on this issue. An “age-constant” nonemployment rate (n
∗ ) is obtained by using 
group-specific nonemployment rates and time-invariant population shares: 
 
ti i t nw n ∗ = ∑  
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The population share of group i at some base year is denoted  i w  and  it n  is the 
nonemployment rate for group i during year t. A positive difference between the actual and 
the age-constant nonemployment rate implies that the age structure has contributed to a rise in 
nonemployment. Figure 3.6 shows the results when using the population shares for seven age 
groups with 1990 as base. The basic message is that the age structure tended to increase 
nonemployment during the 1980s whereas it tended to reduce nonemployment during the 
second half of the 1990s. The maximum effects in both directions amount to one percentage 
point. The age structure effect is negligible during the early 1990s. During the 1990s, the 
relative size of youth cohorts (16-19 and 20-24) declined, a fact that accounts for the negative 
difference between actual and age-constant nonemployment over the second half of the 
decade. 
 
Of course, these exercises are mechanical and ignore various indirect effects, including effects 
on matching efficiency (cf. Shimer, 2001, and Nordström Skans, 2002). It seems safe to 
conclude, however, that the causes of the steep rise in nonemployment in the early 1990s had 
little to do with demographic changes. 
 















3.4 A Rise in Equilibrium Unemployment? 
Several studies have attempted to estimate the equilibrium unemployment rate in Sweden. 
The methods vary and so do the results, although differences in methods do not seem to   32
explain differences in results. Some early studies focused on changes in inflation and 
attempted to determine the unemployment rate consistent with stable inflation. A more 
ambitious structural approach involves estimation of price- and wage-setting schedules. More 
recent work has made use of structural time-series models. Almost all attempts to estimate the 
NAIRU arrive at series that can be described as smoothed versions of the actual 
unemployment rate.  
 
The estimates in Holmlund (1993) indicated a trend rise in NAIRU since the mid-1960s and a 
NAIRU close to 3 percent around 1990. Forslund (1995) estimated wage and price setting 
schedules and solved for the equilibrium unemployment rate; this turned out to be around 4-6 
percent in the early 1990s. Elmeskov et al (1998) reported estimates according to which 
NAIRU had risen by 4 percentage points between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s. Apel and 
Jansson (1999) presented system estimates of potential output and the NAIRU using 
unobserved components methods. The results differed depending on the exact specifications. 
Some specifications indicated a marked rise in the NAIRU over the 1990s, whereas others 
indicated only marginal changes. Recent estimates reported by Konjunkturinstitutet (2002) 
suggest that the NAIRU was around 2 percent during the 1980s and hit 5 percent in the mid-
1990s. 
 
What can be said, then, about equilibrium unemployment in the 1990s? Climbing real interest 
rates probably added to some increase in the NAIRU in the early 1990s but otherwise it is 
difficult to identify sharp changes in the usual structural suspects – benefits, labor market 
institutions, taxes etc – that could explain the huge rise in unemployment. The steep rise in 
unemployment is best understood as being mainly the result of a series of adverse 
macroeconomic shocks.
18 It should be recognized, however, that the shocks hit when 
unemployment in all likelihood was well below the NAIRU; at least part of the rise thus 
reflected an adjustment towards a more sustainable level of unemployment. 
 
                                                 
18 A caveat here is that a cyclical rise in unemployment may lead to a rise in the NAIRU if there are strong 
hysteresis mechanisms. Assarsson and Jansson (1998) and Lindblad (1997) find some evidence that support this 
possibility in the Swedish case. However, the strong labor market rebound of the late 1990s casts doubt on the 
importance of this mechanism.   33
4. Why Did Unemployment Fall?  
In the mid-1990s, unemployment hovered around 8 percent and employment was stagnant or 
even falling. The central bank struggled to establish credibility for the new low inflation 
regime whereas the government’s overriding concern was to bring about fiscal consolidation. 
These priorities led to generally restrictive stances of both monetary and fiscal policies and 
contributed to the weak employment performance in the mid-1990s. However, the policies 
achieved their goals in terms of credible low inflation and fiscal consolidation. When the 
fiscal goals were met by the late 1990s, tax and expenditure policies became more 
expansionary and monetary policy was eased to support the expansion. 
 
The 1990s also saw several structural changes that may have reduced the equilibrium 
unemployment rate. Some of these changes were the results of policy decisions, such as cuts 
in unemployment benefits and regulatory reforms aiming at increased competition in product 
markets. Other changes, such as innovations in wage bargaining arrangements, were not 
directly caused by government policies although they may have been influenced by changes 
in the macroeconomic environment. The rise in employment was probably also facilitated by 
the demographic development. 
 
4.1 Macroeconomic Policies 
Monetary Policy 
When the krona was left to float in November 1992, it depreciated immediately and by the 
end of 1992 it had fallen by 15 percent against the ECU. Competitiveness was restored to a 
level comparable to the situation after the devaluation in 1982. The improved competitiveness 
as well as stronger market growth brought about a rise in exports. Between 1993 and 1995, 
manufacturing output increased by over 20 percent and manufacturing employment by around 
15 percent. Despite this marked rebound, the overall effect on employment was initially 
negligible because of negative contributions to growth from private and public consumption.  
 
In early 1993, the central bank announced a strategy of inflation targeting. The goal of 
monetary policy should be to stabilize annual consumer price inflation at 2 percent, with a 
margin of tolerance of  1 ±  percentage point. A new amendment to the central bank 
legislation, in force from 1999, gave the central bank greater independence from direct 
political influence. A new executive board consisting of six full-time members was made 
responsible for monetary and exchange rate policies.   34
By and large, the new framework for monetary policy has been successful in achieving its 
main goal. Inflation has stayed within the tolerable band for most of the time and a credible 
low inflation regime has been established. The average annual rate of consumer price inflation 
has been 1.6 percent over the period 1993-2002, thus undershooting the inflation target. But 
the low inflation regime did not materialize without costs. Available survey-based estimates 
of inflation expectations from around 1995 indicated that the low inflation target was far from 
universally credible. According to some measures, expectations of medium-term inflation 
hovered around 4 percent. These stubborn inflation expectations triggered a series of central 
bank interventions to establish its non-inflationary credentials. The repo rate (the main 
signaling rate) was raised in steps between 1994 and 1995, reaching close to 9 percent in the 
second half of 1995. These policies appeared to be effective as inflation as well as inflation 
expectations fell over the next couple of years and paved the way for a series of repo rate 
reductions during 1996. 
 
Has the successful conquest of inflation been good or bad for employment? The generally 
restrictive monetary policy of the mid-1990s probably delayed the economic upswing 
although it may have been necessary in order to secure credibility for the low inflation target. 
There is also the more general issue of whether the new monetary policy framework is 
employment-friendly or not. There are pros and cons in this matter. On the pros side, it can be 
argued that a more independent central bank strengthens incentives for wage moderation. On 
the cons side, an ambitious price stabilization target is arguably in conflict with ambitious 
employment goals in the presence of nominal rigidities.  
 
The possibility that wage moderation is encouraged by central bank independence hinges on a 
strategic interaction between wage setters and the central bank and is relevant only if wage 
setting takes place in a coordinated fashion. With coordinated negotiations, the parties in the 
bargain will recognize – and hence internalize – that monetary policy responds to wage 
decisions. A more independent (“conservative”) central bank works as a deterrent to wage 
increases (Rantala, 2001). However, if wage negotiations are decentralized and 
uncoordinated, decisions on wages will not internalize monetary policy reactions. As we shall 
se, Swedish wage setting took a turn towards enhanced coordination in the second half of the 
1990s. The interaction of a more independent central bank and more coordinated wage 
bargaining arrangements has arguably been good for employment. 
   35
The cons side in this matter revolves around the idea that inflation may grease the wheels of 
the labor market. As emphasized by Akerlof et al (1996, 2000) and others, it is plausible that 
an ambitious inflation target in the presence of nominal rigidities can be bad for employment. 
Indeed, the choice of a positive inflation target reflects in part the presumption that nominal 
wages are rigid. Relative wage changes in a non-inflationary environment may require 
nominal wage reductions, something that is difficult to achieve. The presence of nominal 
wage rigidities is confirmed in several empirical studies, including Fehr and Goette (2000) for 
Switzerland and Nickell and Quintini (2001) for the UK.  
 
Some recent studies have tried to pin down the role of nominal rigidities for the long run 
Phillips curve. These contributions include Akerlof (1996, 2000) for the U.S. and Lundborg 
and Sacklén (2001) for Sweden. The results suggest that the long run Phillips curve is 
negatively sloped at low inflation rates. Taking the estimates in Lundborg and Sacklén at face 
values, the inflation rate that minimizes Swedish unemployment would be around 4 percent.
19 
 
The bottom line here is that we can be reasonably sure about the existence of nominal 
rigidities in actual labor markets. It is much more difficult to ascertain how these rigidities 
affect real rigidities and unemployment-inflation tradeoffs. It is plausible that a less ambitious 
Swedish inflation target would have boosted faster employment growth over the 1990s but it 
takes an act of faith to state the magnitude of this effect. 
 
Fiscal Policy 
During 1993, the consolidated public sector’s budget deficit stood at 12 percent of GDP. The 
government’s debt-to-GDP ratio amounted to 76 percent by the end of the year. The need to 
bring government finances under control became a top priority for the new (social 
democratic) government in 1994. The following years involved a major effort to stabilize 
government debt and to reduce the budget deficit. The program entailed expenditure cuts, 
especially concerning transfers, as well as tax increases. The policies were resoundingly 
successful in terms of the stated objectives: by the end of the decade, the government’s budget 
deficit was eliminated and the debt-to-GDP ratio had declined to 60 percent.  
 
                                                 
19 The analysis follows Akerlof et al (2000) and builds on the idea that many agents ignore inflation as long as it 
is low. High inflation is costly to ignore, however, and the standard NAIRU model applies in this region. The 
long-run Phillips curve is negatively sloped for low inflation, positively sloped for intermediate inflation and 
vertical for high inflation.    36
The generally contractive fiscal policy is one reason why unemployment remained stubbornly 
high in the mid-1990s. However, the fiscal consolidation added credibility to the anti-
inflationary stance of macroeconomic policy. Fiscal policies were eased to support growth of 
private and public consumption as the budgetary goals were met and absent any visible threat 
to the low inflation target.  
 
One ingredient of the fiscal consolidation was the introduction in 1996 of a new system for 
decisions on government expenditure. The goal was to establish a long-term approach to 
expenditure decisions. The key innovation involved three-year nominal expenditure ceilings. 
In year 1997, say, decisions should be taken on expenditure for 1998, 1999 and 2000. To 
some degree, this system tied the hands of fiscal policy, although some room was left for 
discretionary policies. This reform was followed by a decision to set a goal for the general 
government budget surplus of 2 percent of GDP as an average over the business cycle.  
 
4.2 Towards a New Regime for Collective Bargaining 
With double-digit wage inflation and an emerging cost crisis, the government initiated a 
“stabilization drive” in 1990 so as to achieve a deceleration of wage inflation. The drive took 
the form of a government-appointed commission that delivered a proposal for economy-wide 
wage restraint for the period 1991-1993. This involved negotiations with over 100 
organizations and the proposal was finally accepted across the whole labor market. The 
efforts appear to have been largely successful. Wage inflation was running at 10 percent in the 
late 1980s and had fallen to 4 percent in 1992 and 2-3 percent in the 1993 and 1994. It is 
difficult to delineate the precise causes of this decline. The rapidly worsening of labor market 
conditions certainly promoted wage restraint but the speed at which the decline took place 
suggests that the stabilization drive also had some impact. The following years involved a 
return to largely uncoordinated industry-wide bargaining, albeit with some effort to mimic 
coordination via the active involvement of mediators. Wage increases in the mid-1990s were 
on the rise and seemed to threaten the inflationary target. However, high productivity growth 
and high profit margins in the business sector moderated the impact on price inflation. 
 
In the summer of 1996, several blue-collar unions in the manufacturing sector launched an 
important initiative that eventually materialized as the so-called Industrial Agreement (IA) of 
1997. The agreement was struck by the blue- and white-collar unions as well as employer 
organizations in the industrial sector and was mainly concerned with procedural “rules of the   37
game”. It represented an attempt to establish consensus around timetables for negotiations, the 
role of mediators, and rules for conflict resolution. A group of “impartial chairs” have been 
appointed and the agreement states rules for when and how these chairs could intervene in the 
negotiation process. For example, they can order a delay of industrial action for up to two 
weeks. The IA model also involves a group of independent economic experts that provide 
basic information about wage developments and general macroeconomic issues.
20  
 
The Industrial Agreement has served as a model for similar agreements in the public sector 
(and also in parts of the service sector). As of 2002, over 50 percent of the labor force is 
covered by IA-type agreements. IA also came to serve as a model for government policies 
concerning industrial relations. A new national mediation institute (Medlingsinstitutet) has 
been created (in operation from June 2000) with the power to appoint mediators even without 
the consent of the parties concerned.  
 
The IA innovations that emerged in the late 1990s represent a move towards informal 
coordination in wage bargaining. The new rules of the game and the efforts to build consensus 
on wage developments consistent with low inflation and high employment may have borne 
some fruit in terms of wage moderation. The reforms pertaining to monetary policy discussed 
above may have reinforced the incentives for wage moderation. It is difficult, however, to 
assess quantitatively how important this effect has been.  
 
Perhaps paradoxically, the move towards informal macro-coordination in wage bargaining has 
taken place simultaneously with a clear shift towards stronger local influence over the 
distribution of wage increases. Pay setting in the public sector is a case in point. Previous 
rigid wage scales have been abandoned and there is, at least in theory, substantial room for 
wage adjustments tailored to the needs of recruiting and retaining employees.  
 
4.3 Employment Regulations and Temporary Work 
Fixed-Term Contracts 
The Swedish legislation on employment protection presumes that, unless otherwise stipulated, 
an employment contract is valid until further notice. When terminating the contract the 
employer must provide a valid reason and advance notice. Compared to many other OECD 
                                                 
20 See Elvander (2002) and Ohlsson (2002) for analyses and discussions of the industrial agreement.   38
countries, the periods of notice are lengthy but no redundancy pay is stipulated. The grounds 
for collective redundancies are liberal although they have to proceed in accordance with 
seniority. During the 1990s there have been no significant reforms of the employment 
protection legislation concerning the termination of open-ended contracts. There have, 
however, been several changes concerning the regulation of fixed-term contracts. 
 
In January 1994 the maximum permitted duration for probationary contracts and those 
motivated by a temporary increase in labor demand were prolonged from 6 to 12 months. 
However, this was immediately repealed in January 1995 when a social democratic 
government had returned to power. A new law in 1997 introduced the opportunity to strike 
collective agreements on derogations from statutory law regarding fixed-term contracts at the 
local level, provided that the parties had a central agreement on other matters. Prior to 1997, 
these agreements could only be made at the central (usually national) level. The 1997 
legislation also opened up for fixed-term contracts without specified reasons.  
 
The sharp fall in total employment in the early 1990s was due to sharply falling “permanent” 
(open-ended) employment and not the result of a decline in the number of fixed-term 
contracts. In fact, the number of fixed-term contracts stood at approximately the same level in 
the first quarter of 1994 as it did four years earlier. The overall decline in total employment 
was marginally offset by a slight increase in self-employment. 
 
Figure 4.1 displays the evolution of permanent and temporary employment over the period 
from 1987 and onwards. The strikingly different developments of permanent and temporary 
employment stand out. When the economy approached the cyclical peak in the late 1980s, we 
observe rising permanent employment along with a decline in the number of fixed-term 
contracts. From the early 1990s and during most of the rest of the decade there is a 
remarkable increase in fixed-term contracts that amounts to roughly 50 percent. Measured 
relative to total wage and salary employment, the number of temporary workers rose from 10 
percent to 16 percent; see Figure 4.2. Notice also the declining share of temporary workers 
over the late 1990s with generally improving labor market conditions, a development similar 
to the late 1980s.  
 
Why did fixed-term contracts exhibit this almost relentless growth during the 1990s? 
Holmlund and Storrie (2002) discuss this issue and conclude that legislative changes are   39
unlikely to be important. A more promising explanation focuses on the consequences of 
adverse macroeconomic conditions. A recession is associated with relatively more hirings on 
temporary contracts, presumably reflecting stronger incentives on part of firms to offer short-
term jobs when workers are easier to find as well as an increased willingness on part of 
workers to accept temporary work when job offers in general are in short supply. The 
Swedish experience as well as the developments of temporary work in the other Nordic 
countries lends support to this hypothesis. The share of temporary work has been relatively 
stable in Norway (with stable or falling unemployment) but increased sharply in Finland over 
the 1990s, i.e., a period when Finnish unemployment skyrocketed. 
21 
 
The effects of a rising number of fixed-term contracts on flows into unemployment are 
obvious, at least in an accounting sense: the higher the share of fixed-term contracts, the 
larger the inflow to unemployment as these contracts entail substantially higher 
unemployment risks than open-ended contracts.
22 As noted, there has been a marked rise in 
unemployment inflow over the decade. Roughly 50 percent of this rise in inflow can be 
accounted for by higher inflow from temporary jobs. To the extent that there has been a trend 
rise in temporary work that will prevail also in favorable macroeconomic conditions – which 
seems reasonable – it is conceivable that it has contributed to some increase in equilibrium 
unemployment through higher job separation rates.  
 
Fixed-term contracts may however also have favorable effects on job finding, as firms are 
likely to perceive such contracts as less risky than open-ended ones. Indeed, there is some 
evidence that participation in temporary employment in Sweden may reduce subsequent 
unemployment (Korpi and Levin, 2001). The overall effect on duration from increased 
prevalence of temporary jobs is not easily quantified, however. As a crude check of possible 
effects on unemployment duration we estimated several equations explaining transition rates 
from unemployment to employment using aggregate data on quarterly transition rates for the 
period 1987-2000. In addition to a measure of labor market tightness, the fraction of 
temporary workers in total employment was included as independent variable. The latter 
                                                 
21 The countercyclicality of temporary jobs is confirmed by simple regressions. If the share of fixed-term 
contracts is taken as dependent variable and the vacancy/unemployment ratio as the cyclical variable, the latter 
variable enters with a negative and statistically significant coefficient. See Holmlund and Storrie (2002) for 
further results and discussions. 
22 Over the period 1987-2000, the flow data from the labor force surveys indicate that the average risk of 
becoming unemployed was more than ten times higher for a temporary worker than for a worker on an open-
ended contract.    40
variable might serve as a proxy for the fraction of job openings that involves fixed-term 
contracts. However, the proxy-variable did not come out significant. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Permanent and temporary wage and salary employment 1987-2002 



































Source: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Temporary work as percent of total wage and salary employment and 































  Source: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden. 
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Temporary Work Agencies 
Employment intermediaries in the form of temporary agency work have been on the rise in 
most OECD countries in recent years. The workers concerned are employed in temporary 
work agencies (TWA) but assigned to work at a different user firm. It has been estimated that 
over two million workers in EU were employed in the TWA sector in the late 1990s (Storrie, 
2002). 
 
Since 1993, Sweden has one of the most liberal TWA regulations in the OECD. Most EU 
countries have some specific regulations concerning TWAs. Sweden, on the other hand, has 
essentially no special regulation. The TWA sector was virtually illegal and therefore non-
existent in Sweden before 1993. It is still small and accounts for less than one percent of the 
labor force (Andersson and Wadensjö, 2002). The sector is presumably considerably more 
important in terms of new hires. In Sweden, fixed-term contracts account for an 
overwhelming majority of new hires even though the share of the stock of employees is only 
around 15 percent. Analogously, it is likely that TWAs are much more quantitatively 
important for the flows than for the stocks. 
 
There is so far only scanty empirical knowledge about the TWA sector and its labor market 
impact. It is plausible that TWAs can have favorable impact on overall recruitments by 
effectively reducing hiring costs. These effects may conceivably be stronger in an economy 
with stringent employment protection, i.e., high costs of hiring and firing. Emerging evidence 
from the U.S. suggests that TWAs can serve to screen prospective employees and thereby 
perhaps improve matching between workers and vacancies. Some simple regressions run by 
Katz and Krueger (1999) on U.S. state data suggest that wage inflation has been lower in 
states with a higher initial TWA share. Taken at face values, their estimates would imply that 
TWAs have contributed to a decline in the NAIRU in the 1990s relative to the 1980s.  
 
In summary, the 1990s have seen notable changes concerning employment contracts in the 
Swedish labor market. The steep rise in the number of fixed-term contracts appear to be an 
endogenous response to macroeconomic and possibly also structural (but not well understood) 
factors; in any event, the increase has little to do with legislative changes. The fast growth of 
employment intermediaries is clearly due to a major reform in the early 1990s. The growth of 
fixed-term contracts may have caused some rise in unemployment through more frequent   42
worker separations. The growth of the temporary work agencies should have improved 
matching efficiency. On balance, the total effect on unemployment is probably small. 
 
4.4 Deregulations in Product Markets 
Standard theory predicts that more competitive product markets are conducive to low 
unemployment, at least in the long run. More intense competition brings about increased 
output and employment at given wage costs. It should also foster wage moderation by raising 
the costs to unions of aggressive wage demands. See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001) for a 
comprehensive discussion of short run and long run effects. 
 
The 1990s have seen a general trend towards increased competition in Swedish product 
markets. The areas of deregulation include public procurement, telecommunications, energy, 
domestic air-traffic, railway transport and taxi. The share of household consumption that is 
directed at markets exposed to competitive forces increased between 1991 and 1999 by 7 
percentage points (Braunerhjelm et al, 2002). A new competition law has been put in place in 
1993 that involved tougher sanctions against non-competitive behavior in product markets. In 
addition, there has been some rise in competitive pressure arising from Sweden’s participation 
in the European economic integration. 
 
Nicoletti et al (2001) have tried to obtain quantitative estimates of the impact of product 
market regulations on employment by exploiting information on regulatory reform in OECD 
countries since the late 1970s. Taken at face values, the estimated effects are quantitatively 
nontrivial. The results for Sweden would imply that regulatory reform over the 1980s and the 
1990s have added 2 percentage points to private sector employment relative to population.
23 
Although this estimate should be taken with at least the usual caution, it points in the “right” 
direction. It is likely that the regulatory reforms in conjunction with intensified international 
competition have led to some decline in the Swedish NAIRU.  
 
4. 5 Unemployment Insurance 
The fiscal crisis in the early 1990s induced a sequence of decisions to make the UI system less 
generous and less expensive. The statutory replacement rate was reduced from 90 to 80 
percent the 1
st of July 1993 and was further reduced to 75 percent from the 1
st of January 
                                                 
23 See OECD Employment Outlook 2002, chapter 5. A caveat is that the results also indicate that product market 
regulations are less harmful in countries with corporatist wage setting regimes.   43
1996. It is noteworthy that the main motivation for benefit cuts was the need to exercise fiscal 
restraint. Concerns about possible adverse incentive effects have not played a major role in 
the Swedish political debate. In fact, in the wake of fiscal consolidation in the late 1990s, a 
decision was taken to raise the UI replacement rate to 80 percent from September 1997.  
 
The average effective replacement rate depends also on the benefit ceiling. The ceiling was 
reduced in 1993 and remained constant in nominal terms until 1998 when a rise was 
undertaken. However, the increase was small and did not even restore the nominal value of 
the pre-1993 ceiling. The next adjustments of the ceiling came in 2001 and 2002. The 
combination of a slightly declining benefit ceiling and continuous nominal wage growth led to 
a substantial fall in replacement rates for workers with above-average earnings. Figure 4.3 
shows replacement rates by wage percentiles of the overall wage distribution. For workers in 
the first quartile (P25) of the wage distribution, the fall in replacement rates between 1992 and 
2000 amounts to 10 percentage points (which is equal to the statutory change since these 
workers are well below the ceiling). The fall amounts to 20 percentage points for a median-
wage worker (P50) and to 25 percentage points or more for workers in the top quarter (P75) 
of the wage distribution.  
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Source: Own computations using benefit data from the insurance unit of the National Labour 
Market Board and wage data from the statistical yearbooks of wages and salaries from Statistics 
Sweden. 
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The overall generosity of the UI system has thus fallen since the early 1990s. Although the 
(prospective) replacement rates have declined substantially for a typical employed worker, 
they have fallen less for a typical unemployed individual since the latter have generally 
below-average (previous and prospective) wages. Data from the 1990s indicate that some 20 
percent of the workers that entered insured unemployment received less than the statutory 
replacement rate (Carling et al, 2001).  
 
Available empirical studies indicate that the benefit cuts of 1993 and 1996 led to a fall in the 
duration of unemployment. Harkman (1997) examined the 1993 reform and found that it had 
some positive effect on job finding. He also identified a fairly large positive effect on the exit 
rate to nonparticipation. Carling et al (2001) investigated the effects of the 1996 benefit cut 
and estimated a positive job finding effect but found no effect on labor force exits.  
 
Received theory suggests that higher replacement rates should raise wage pressure so there is 
a presumption that the benefit cuts have caused wage moderation. Unfortunately, it has been 
notoriously difficult to pin down precisely how UI benefits affect wage determination. Two 
recent studies report somewhat conflicting results. Forslund and Kolm (2000) find some 
evidence supporting the conventional hypothesis but the results are sensitive to the exact 
specifications. Nymoen and Rødseth (2003) cannot confirm that replacement rates matter for 
Swedish wage setting. 
 
A major UI reform was undertaken in 2001. A benefit recipient can restrict job search to his 
or her occupation and local labor market during the first 100 days of unemployment. After 
this period, the search area has to widen. In some sense, these new rules represented a move 
towards increased generosity since the previous system involved no rights to restrict search. 
In practice, however, it may well have been the case that such “search area” rules were used 
also before 2001. The 2001 reform also set the maximum UI period to 300 days for all 
eligible unemployed, irrespective of age (compared to 450 days for older workers in the 
previous system). Furthermore, participation in a labor market program should no longer 
serve as qualification for UI. The rules for sanctioning an unemployed individual who does 
not pursue active search were also changed in 2001. The previous system entailed fairly harsh 
punishment for failure to meet search requirements (complete withdrawal of benefits for a 
certain time period). The new system involves milder sanctions (such as a reduction of   45
benefits by 25 or 50 percent), the idea being that sanctions should be enforced more 
frequently.  
 
In summary, the UI system around the year 2000 was less generous than in the early 1990s. 
There is some evidence that the benefit cuts during the 1990s have reduced the duration of 
unemployment and presumably therefore also reduced the NAIRU. If these effects were 
quantitatively important, they should also reveal themselves in aggregate data on job findings 
and possibly as a leftward shift of the “inflow-constant” Beveridge curve. However, such 
effects do not speak loudly in the data. Some simple transition rate models indicate reasonably 
stable relationships between labor market tightness and job finding over the period since the 
late 1980s. This suggests that whatever effects there have been, they have probably been 
quantitatively modest. 
 
4.6 Active Labor Market Policy 
The labor market recovery of the late 1990s was associated with a decline in the volume of 
active labor market programs. In 1997, ALMPs stood at 4.7 percent relative to the labor force; 
by 2001, the ALMP rate had fallen to 2.5 percent.  
 
The 1990s have seen not only an increase in various ALMP measures but also a marked 
growth in the number of evaluation studies. Is there any evidence that the intensive use of 
ALMPs has had beneficial employment effects? By and large, such positive evidence is rather 
hard to find. There is fairly clear evidence that subsidized employment has had large 
crowding-out effects. Similar crowding-out effects are not found for training programs. The 
experiences of youth programs are largely negative: it has been difficult to find positive 
effects on earnings or employment.
24  
 
On the positive side, there is some evidence that ALMPs have encouraged labor force 
participation, which may have facilitated the employment rebound in the late 1990s. 
Johansson (2001) examined panel data on labor market programs and labor force participation 
for Swedish municipalities over the period 1986-1998. She found that a rise in program 
                                                 
24 Calmfors et al (2001) present a comprehensive survey of Swedish experiences of active labor market policies. 
Larsson (2002) presents evaluations of youth programs. Fredriksson and Johansson (2003) examine how 
program participation affects reemployment rates among prime-aged individuals. Martin and Grubb (2001) 
provide evidence for a number of OECD countries.   46
activity led to a non-trivial increase in labor force participation although it is unclear to which 
extent this reflects active job search as opposed to “benefit seeking”.  
 
All in all, it is plausible that the intensive use of ALMPs has resulted in lower open 
unemployment than otherwise would have prevailed. It is less clear, however, whether the 
policies have had much positive effect on total employment.  
 
4.7 Other Suspects  
It remains to briefly consider other factors that may have contributed to the fall in 
unemployment. Among the possible suspects, the tax system is not a plausible one since there 
have been few changes in the system. However, there have been changes in demographics, 
public employment and absenteeism that most likely have reinforced the decline in 
unemployment in the late 1990s. 
 
Concerning demographic changes, Figure 3.6 above has provided a picture of how changes in 
the age composition of the population have affected nonemployment over the period 1987-
2001. The declining relative size of youth cohorts has produced a “mechanical” decline in 
nonemployment in the late 1990s and early 2000s that amounts to around one percentage 
point. The conventional presumption would be that this demographic development has caused 
some decline in the NAIRU. However, recent work on demographics and search cautions 
against very strong beliefs in the conventional wisdom; cf. Shimer (2001) and Nordström 
Skans (2002). 
 
The evolution of public sector employment in recent years has also contributed to a fall in 
(cyclical) unemployment. When fiscal policy became more expansionary, this also affected 
public sector employment. Between 1997 and 2001, public employment rose by around  
40 000 persons, corresponding to 0.5 percent of working age population; cf. Figure 3.1.  
 
Finally, consider cyclical absenteeism. As shown in Figure 3.2, absenteeism has risen sharply 
since the mid-1990s. A mirror image of this development is a marked decline in average work 
hours among the employed (Figure 3.3). This decline in average work hours should have 
raised the demand for workers compared to an alternative with constant absenteeism and work 
hours. This “work sharing” effect is potentially quantitatively important, considering the 
substantial (3 percent) decline in average hours per employed.   47
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The paper has argued that adverse macroeconomic shocks were mainly responsible for the 
steep rise in Swedish unemployment in the early 1990s. These shocks had both domestic and 
foreign origins, where the domestic shocks were the results of major policy failures. The 
timing of financial liberalization and the “tax reform of the century” was certainly not well 
designed. The consumption boom that emerged in the late 1980s, involving gradually rising 
inflation as well as falling unemployment, could have been curtailed by fiscal policy. 
However, fiscal policy was generally too lax and the hands of monetary policy were tied to 
the defense of the fixed exchange rate. When macroeconomic policy finally took a firm anti-
inflationary stand, the economy was already edging towards recession. The depth of the 
recession was reinforced by the international recession of the early 1990s and by increasing 
real interest rates.  
 
The strong recovery in the late 1990s has moderated fears that the high unemployment should 
become persistent. In many respects, the labor market rebound from 1997 and onwards 
indicate that the Swedish labor market has worked reasonably well. Wage inflation has been 
largely under control, job finding rates have risen uniformly across unemployed individuals 
with short and very long time in joblessness, and there is little evidence of worsening 
matching problems.  
 
Several policy changes may have contributed to some decline in the NAIRU over the 1990s. 
Unemployment benefits have become less generous, the labor market has been opened for 
employment intermediaries, and regulatory reforms have enhanced competition in product 
markets. Moreover, innovations in collective bargaining arrangements have facilitated 
informal coordination of wage negotiations. 
 
Although there are grounds for a generally positive rating of recent Swedish labor market 
performance, there are also grounds for a less sanguine verdict. The problems become evident 
as one redirects attention from unemployment to nonemployment. The overall 
nonemployment rate among prime-aged individuals increased from 8.4 percent in 1990 to 
17.4 percent in 1995 and had declined to 15.4 percent in 2001. This development of 
nonemployment is mirrored by a sharp fall in labor force participation during the early 1990s. 
Some of the rise in nonparticipation is probably “natural” and socially beneficial. For   48
example, it reflects in part more enrollment in higher education. However, there is also a trend 
towards more inactivity in the form of long-term sickness and early retirement. In fact, the 
overall labor force participation rate is roughly the same in 2001 as in 1995, and lower for 
prime-aged individuals. To the extent that there are important interaction effects between 
shocks and institutions, as discussed by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), they have probably 
mainly operated by reducing participation as a result of generous schemes favoring 
nonparticipation. 
 
Swedish labor market policies have traditionally focused on open unemployment and been 
less concerned with employment. There are signs that policies are changing towards more 
emphasis on employment.
25 This is a welcome reorientation, not the least in light of future 
demographic developments. This reorientation towards enhancing employment needs to 
address several routes to inactivity, notably sick absence and early retirements. A unified 
approach to unemployment, employment and nonparticipation also needs to take seriously the 
evidence that suggests that incentives for non-work activities arise in rules pertaining to early 
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